The Advancement of Learning Page #57

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

• Essay

								

frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so
governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; but
the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted.  These
respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.

(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary
actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government.
For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be
three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever—wisdom of the
behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but
much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an
influence also into business and government.  The poet saith, Nec vultu
destrue verba tuo: a man may destroy the force of his words with his
countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his
brother affability and easy access; Nil interest habere ostium apertum,
vultum clausum: it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and
to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance.  So we see Atticus,
before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending,
did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his
countenance and gesture.  And if the government of the countenance be of
such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage
appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well
expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: Ne aut arrogans
videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est àlienæ libertatis obliti,
alterum suæ: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity,
without intruding upon the liberty of others.  On the other side, if
behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass
into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam
transferre—to act a man’s life?  But although it proceed not to that
extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much.  And
therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by
saying, Amici fures temporis: so certainly the intending of the
discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation.  Again, such as
are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and
seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do
seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything
becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and
compliments.  Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an
over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is
time and season.  For as Solomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, non
seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet: a man must make his
opportunity, as oft as find it.  To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as
a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment.  For it
ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to
be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any
deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for
exercise or motion.  But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly
handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto
collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the
professors of learning.  For from this root springeth chiefly that note
or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there
is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom.  For of the three
wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of
behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an
inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government,
they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that
happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is
most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered
advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject.
For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned
men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without
learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should
be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less
infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in some
part reduced.  Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in
the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that
it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general
wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at
certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use
their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them,
and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing
of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every
other occasion incident to man’s life.  So as there is a wisdom of
counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal
insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon
particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of
causes of like nature.  For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth
to his brother, De petitione consulatus (being the only book of
business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a
particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of
many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a
perpetual direction in the case of popular elections.  But chiefly we may
see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed
by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as
the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we
see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts,
positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay
a while, offering to consideration some number of examples.

(6) Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam,
ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi.  Here is commended the
provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it
was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’
papers unperused.

Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive
rideat, non inveniet requiem.  Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than
himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to
jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways

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