The Advancement of Learning Page #56

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

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whereas the other course is like the work of the hand.  For as when a
carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as
if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude
stone still, till such times as he comes to it.  But contrariwise when
nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all
the parts at one time.  So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man
practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like
but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what
virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend
unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself
thereunto.  Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express
himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine.  His words
are these: Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam, quæ supra
humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem; and a little after,
Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est, swic neque Dei: sed hic
quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aluid quiddam a vitio.
And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus
attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, “That men
needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue
as good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been only an
imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it.  But these be heathen
and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind,
which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting
upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of
perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.
And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a
false imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista lœvo ad humanam
vitam—that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist
or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules
and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that
facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so
certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work
him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality
can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other.  Nay, further,
as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise
the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or
excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same
instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though
they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess.  Only charity
admitteth no excess.  For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power,
the angels transgressed and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo:
by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell;
Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum: but by aspiring to a
similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever
transgressed, or shall transgress.  For unto that imitation we are
called: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos,
et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii
Patris vestri qui in cœlis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos
et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos.  So in the first platform
of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus
Maximus: and the sacred Scriptures thus, Miscericordia ejus super omnia
opera ejus.

(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the
culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the
arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to
collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by
others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well.  But
as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians)
that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink
wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of
sleep—

    “Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
    Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
    Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
    Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in
knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) is the more
vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth forth the falser
dreams.

(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy,
which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and
spirit.  Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation
or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body.  For
as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and
pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral
knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without
perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile
for all duties of life.  These three, as in the body, so in the mind,
seldom meet, and commonly sever.  For it is easy to observe, that many
have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from
perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have
an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of
honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and
reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business;
and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three.  As for pleasure,
we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to
stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it,
than in the strength and vigour of it.

XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all
others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom.
Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “That the Romans were like sheep,
for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for
in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would
follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than
policy.  Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of
internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external
goodness; for that as to society sufficeth.  And therefore it cometh oft
to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in
the Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc
poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum.  Again,
states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of

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