The Advancement of Learning Page #62

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

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manners—by offering and obtruding a man’s self, wherein men think he is
rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that
which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and
by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation,
applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let
him hear what is truly said: Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris,
si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat.

(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the
valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners—by
caution, by colour, and by confidence.  Caution is when men do
ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which
they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will
thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and
proclaim all their wants.  Colour is when men make a way for themselves
to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from
a better cause or intended for some other purpose.  For of the one it is
well said,

    “Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,”

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the
virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a
coward, mildness; and so the rest.  For the second, a man must frame some
probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble
his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities
which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but
industries and dissimulations.  For confidence, it is the last but the
surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man
cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who
endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down
the price of others.  But there is a confidence that passeth this other,
which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he
is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again,
to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those
things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets,
that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say,
“That that line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and
presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which
they know well enough to be the best in the number.  But above all, in
this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, he must
take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury,
by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some
sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge.  Which kind of fortified carriage,
with a ready rescussing of a man’s self from scorns, is sometimes of
necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it
ever succeedeth with good felicity.

(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to
frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing
hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this: Idem manebat, neque idem
decebat—men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to
Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he
had versatile ingenium.  And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn
wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more
dignity than felicity.  But in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious
and enwrapped, and not easy to turn.  In some it is a conceit that is
almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe
that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it
in former experience.  For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus
would have been temporising still, according to his old bias, when the
nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit.  In some other it
is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not
discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the
occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country
fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then
they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before.  In some other it
is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring
about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other
remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave
for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at
first have had all three for the simple.  But from whatsoever root or
cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most
prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our
mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with
that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well
expressed, Fatis accede deisque, that men do not only turn with the
occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit
or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions
that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not
occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please
the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake:
which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with
the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which
Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut
exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ;
ut quæipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus persequi
cogantur.  For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of
sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly
and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own
plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very
imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in
the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of
secrecy, and making way (qualis est via navis in mari, which the French
calleth sourdes menées, when men set things in work without opening
themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many
times dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum
illaqueant.  And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a
natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them.  For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a
kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they
stood his friends or enemies.”  So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul,

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