The Advancement of Learning Page #60

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

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not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time,
and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and
the like.  For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in
itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous:
for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are
one, and when they return to their nature they are another.  These
informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the
minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of
observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground
a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith,
Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir prudens
exhauriet illud.  And although the knowledge itself falleth not under
precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the
obtaining of it may.

(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the
ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and
distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to
words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to
set and purposed words.  Neither let that be feared which is said,
Fronti nulla fides, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and
not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and
gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is Animi janua, “the gate
of the mind.”  None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of
Gallus, Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat.  So again, noting the
differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in
the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech
of Germanicus, thus: Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut
penitus sentire crederetur; but of Drusus thus: Paucioribus sed
intentior, et fida oratione; and in another place, speaking of his
character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular,
he saith, “That in other things he was velut eluctantium verborum;” but
then again, solutius loquebatur quando subveniret.  So that there is no
such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance
(vultus jussus), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these
fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and
formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily
and hardly.

(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted
without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: Fraus
sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat; and the
Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is
better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause.  For small
favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to
industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimenta socordiæ.  So
again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular
which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and
unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus
advanced many of the friends of Antonius, Simul amicis ejus præfecturas
et tribunatus largitur: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he
did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.

(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of
flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with
the advantage of passion and affection.  For so we see Tiberius, upon a
stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his
dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of
which Tacitus saith, Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere:
correptamque Græco versu admonuit, ideo lædi quia non regnaret.  And,
therefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men
to confess their secrets:—

    “Vino torus et ira.”

And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so
settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes
upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open
themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,
according to the proverb of Spain, Di mentira, y sacar as verdad:
“Tell a lie and find a truth.”

(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:
men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their
virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from
their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends,
with whom they discourse most.  General fame is light, and the opinions
conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more
masked: Verior fama e domesticis emanat.

(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their
natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by
their natures, and the wisest by their ends.  For it was both pleasantly
and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope,
returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion
being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished
that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very
wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do.
And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to
suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian
proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:—

    “Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
    C’è ne manco che non credi.”

“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men
do account upon.”

(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their
natures, and private persons by their ends.  For princes being at the top
of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto
they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of
the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that
maketh their hearts more inscrutable.  Neither is it sufficient to inform
ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also
of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is
principally sought.  For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself
outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures,
metus ejus rimatur, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the
other’s neck.

(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in
three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with
those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and

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