The Advancement of Learning Page #53

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

• Essay

								

ut multa juste fieri possint.  But the reply is good: Auctorem
præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem futuræ non habes.  Men must pursue
things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine
Providence.  So then we pass on from this general part touching the
exemplar and description of good.

XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it
remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without
which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or
statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and
motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: Necesse
est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur.
Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus
modos et vias ignorare.  Non enum de virtute tantum, qua specie sit,
quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat: utrumque enum
volumeus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex
voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo.  In such full
words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part.  So saith
Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied
himself to philosophy, Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi.
And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any
consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca
excellently saith, De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summa
nemo), may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with
that aphorism of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non
sentiunt, iis mens ægrotat.  They need medicine, not only to assuage
the disease, but to awake the sense.  And if it be said that the cure of
men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral
philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble
handmaid.  For as the Psalm saith, “That the eyes of the handmaid look
perpetually towards the mistress,” and yet no doubt many things are left
to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so
ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of
divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many
sound and profitable directions.

(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but
find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; the
rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and
action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men
(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their
books.  It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more
particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit
ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible,
and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have
written.  We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof,
that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we
ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the
one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of
application only.  The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of
the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the
constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents.  So in the
culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command:
points of Nature, and points of fortune.  For to the basis of the one,
and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied.  In these
things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application:—

    “Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:”

and so likewise,

    “Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.”

But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and
neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which
draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth
adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating
or applying.  Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the
exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto
which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take
measure of the body.

(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound
and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and
tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to
those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and
causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture;
wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to
describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention.
For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are
proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle
handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it
not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to
intend many matters, and others to few?  So that some can divide
themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in
few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as
well as a pusillanimity.  And again, that some minds are proportioned to
that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time;
others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of
pursuit:—

    “Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.”

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly
also ascribed to God as a magnanimity.  So further deserved it to be
considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in conversation
(supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s
self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and
cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be considered.  “That there
is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more
serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to
take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to
take distaste at the good of another?” which is that properly which we
call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I
cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the
several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in
morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and
suppeditation to them both.  A man shall find in the traditions of
astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to
the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action,

								Rate this book:0.0 / 0 votes