The Advancement of Learning Page #38

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

• Essay

								

from God, so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by
accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject
of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state
of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance.
Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices;
which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than
kindled truth: divination and fascination.

(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and
natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by
argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is, when the mind
hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign.
Artificial is of two sorts: either when the argument is coupled with a
derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon
a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter
for the most part is superstitious, such as were the heathen observations
upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of
bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like.  For
artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst
particular knowledges.  The astronomer hath his predictions, as of
conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like.  The physician hath his
predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of
diseases.  The politique hath his predictions; O urbem venalem, et
cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit! which stayed not long to be
performed, in Sylla first, and after in Cæsar: so as these predictions
are now impertinent, and to be referred over.  But the divination which
springeth from the internal nature of the soul is that which we now speak
of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion.
Primitive is grounded upon the supposition that the mind, when it is
withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of
the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore
appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in
waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences
and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself.  By
influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or
glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and
spirits: unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce.  For the
retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most susceptible
of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a
fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and not with a
repose and quiet, as it is in the other.

(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon other
bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in the proper
place.  Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended
natural magic, have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power
of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working
faith.  Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their view
the secret passages of things, and specially of the contagion that
passeth from body to body, do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to
nature that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit
to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have
grown (now almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of
confidence, and the like.  Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise
and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power,
then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it.  And herein
comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of
ceremonial magic.  For it may be pretended that ceremonies, characters,
and charms do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil
spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth
it; as images are said by the Roman Church to fix the cogitations and
raise the devotions of them that pray before them.  But for mine own
judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that
ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and
intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as
opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, In sudore vultus
comedes panem tuum.  For they propound those noble effects, which God
hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be
attained by a few easy and slothful observances.  Deficiences in these
knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it
is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.

XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man
is of two kinds—the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the
other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth
position or decree, the latter action or execution.  It is true that the
imagination is an agent or nuncius in both provinces, both the judicial
and the ministerial.  For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason
have judged, and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can
be acted.  For imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion.  Saving that
this Janus of imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards
reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the
print of good; which nevertheless are faces,

    “Quales decet esse sororum.”

Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested
with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the
duty of the message.  For it was well said by Aristotle, “That the mind
hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman;
but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a
magistrate hath over a free citizen,” who may come also to rule in his
turn.  For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our
imagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever
access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams.  And
again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other
impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true
appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the
imagination.  Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth
properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the
former division.  For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of
imagination than a work or duty thereof.  And if it be a work, we speak
not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of
such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination.  No more than we

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