The Advancement of Learning Page #29

The Advancement of Learning, published by Francis Bacon in 1605, is a foundational text in the history of science and philosophy. In this work, Bacon advocates for empirical research and the systematic organization of knowledge, laying the groundwork for the scientific method. The book critiques existing scholarly practices and proposes a new approach to learning based on observation and experimentation. It marks a significant shift towards modern scientific inquiry.

• Essay

								

philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together; as
that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary
and fabulous philosophy.

(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an
appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable
nor interdicted.  For although the Scripture saith, “Let no man deceive
you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into
that he knoweth not,” &c., yet notwithstanding if you observe well that
precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only
forbidden—adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them, either to
extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to
extol a man’s knowledge of them further than he hath ground.  But the
sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of Holy
Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained.  So of
degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the
employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them;
but the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their
illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom.
For so the apostle saith, “We are not ignorant of his stratagems.”  And
it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to
inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in
morality.  But this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as
deficient, for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather
challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and
fantastical.

VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not
divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all as
the haven and sabbath of all man’s contemplations) we will now proceed to
natural philosophy.  If then it be true that Democritus said, “That the
truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves;” and if it be
true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a
second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which
nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide
natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace, and to make two
professions or occupations of natural philosophers—some to be pioneers
and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer.  And surely
I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and
scholastical terms: namely, that these be the two parts of natural
philosophy—the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects;
speculative and operative; natural science, and natural prudence.  For as
in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of
direction; so is it in natural.  And here I will make a request, that for
the latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive and reintegrate
the misapplied and abused name of natural magic, which in the true sense
is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to the
ancient acception, purged from vanity and superstition.  Now although it
be true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes
and effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have
a great connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful
natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and
descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and
descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I
judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and
handled.

(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic;
wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysic in a
differing sense from that that is received.  And in like manner, I doubt
not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other
particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the
ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms.  For hoping well to
deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of
that I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as
little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with
truth and the proficience of knowledge.  And herein I cannot a little
marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of
difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; undertaking not only
to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish
all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient
author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and
drawing followers and disciples, he took the right course.  For certainly
there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted
and pronounced in the highest truth:—Veni in nomine partis, nec
recipits me; si quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis.  But in
this divine aphorism (considering to whom it was applied, namely, to
antichrist, the highest deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in
a man’s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good
sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an
eum recipietis.  But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think
of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth
he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer
all nations.  Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men’s
hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar
did:—

    “Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo
    Editus exemplum, &c.”

So,

    “Felix doctrinæ prædo.”

But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen
to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it
seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras; and, therefore,
to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and
definitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government;
where, although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus
wisely noteth, eadem magistratuum vocabula.

(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term metaphysic
as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been
already said, that I intend philosophia prima, summary philosophy and
metaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two
distinct things.  For the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor
to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or
descendant of natural science.  It appeareth likewise that I have
assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and axioms which are
promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences; I have assigned unto it

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